Strategic Responses to New Technologies and Their Impact on Firm Performance
Modern corporations must adopt and assimilate new technologies to build and sustain competitive advantage. The authors develop a theoretical framework to understand the relationships among (1) strategic responses to new technologies, (2) organizational resources, and (3) firm performance. Specifically, they theorize that a strategic response can be categorized according to the dimensions of magnitude, domain, and speed, and they conceptualize organizational resources as tangible and intangible. The authors operationalize this framework for the adoption of the Internet by traditional store-based retailers, for which they posit strategic responses as the speed of (1) adopting the Internet as a communications channel, (2) adopting the Internet as a sales channel, and (3) forming e-alliances. In addition, they use resource slack to represent organizational resources. Results from nine years (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) of data on 106 firms establish the influence of strategic responses on firm performance (i.e., market valuation of the firm, operationalized as Tobin's q). Specifically, the results show that both the adoption of the Internet as a communications channel and e-alliance formation positively influence firm performance. The positive effect of communications channel adoption on firm performance is enhanced further by the use of slack resources. Post hoc analysis reveals that the adoption of the Internet as a sales channel seems to matter only to firms that have preexisting catalog operations.
A s new technologies become ubiquitous, firms must adopt and assimilate them to gain and sustain competitive advantage (e.g., Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Tushman and Anderson 1986) . Recent examplessuch as the adoptions of biotechnology by pharmaceutical firms, semiconductors by machine tools firms, video banking by commercial banks (Pennings and Harianto 1992) , and information technology (IT) by a diverse set of firms such as small office professionals (Kim, Han, and Srivastava 2002) and market makers (Grewal, Comer, and Mehta 2001) -illustrate the importance of this organizational phenomenon. Although the literature has focused on strategic responses to competitive threats (Heil and Robertson 1991) , theoretical developments and empirical investigations of strategic responses to new technologies have been lacking.
As a result of inherent differences in organizational routines (Nelson and Winter 1982) , business processes (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999) , and resources (Wernerfelt 1984) , firms are expected to differ in their strategic responses to new technologies. Organizational routines and business processes are likely to determine the efficacy of resources while the firm adopts and assimilates new technologies. Therefore, firm differences in strategic responses to new technologies and firm resources should result in performance heterogeneity (Rumelt 1974) . Thus, it becomes important to understand (1) the impact of strategic responses on firm performance and (2) the role of organizational resources in the relationship between the strategic responses and firm performance. To address these research questions and to understand the relationships among strategic responses to new technologies, organizational resources, and firm performance, we theorize about strategic responses along the dimensions of magnitude, domain, and speed (Heil and Robertson 1991) , and we posit that organizational resources consist of tangible and intangible resources (Barney 1991) .
The intensity of the organizational response to a new technology represents the response magnitude. At the extremes, firms may decide either not to adopt the new technology or to reengineer their business processes to assimilate the new technology (e.g., Gatignon, Anderson, and Helsen 1989) . Midrange responses are also possible, in which firms adopt a technology on an experimental basis. In addition to the intensity of response, firms may differ in the business process (response domain) that they decide to alter to adopt the new technology (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999) . For example, one firm may use advances in communications technology to revamp its logistics activities; another may use the same technology to streamline customer relationship management (CRM). Finally, the speed with which firms adopt the new technology may vary across firms, and timely responses should enable them to gain early-mover advantages (e.g., Lieberman and Mont-gomery 1988) . By combining these three dimensions, we capture a firm's strategic response.
Firms are likely to use their resources to implement their strategic responses to new technologies. Resources include both tangible and intangible organizational assets, such as managerial skills and know-how, organizational processes and routines, market-based assets, human assets, and financial assets such as cash (e.g., Hunt and Morgan 1995; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998) , that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable (Barney 1991) . Resources are the products of a firm's history and the outcomes of its prior strategic actions (Barney 2001) . The endowments of such resources affect a firm's competitive position and its ability to generate economic rents (Rumelt 1974) . We suggest that resources help determine the efficacy of strategic responses to new technologies.
To test this framework empirically, we need a context (industrial sector) in which (1) a new technology has had widespread influence, (2) there are differences in strategic responses to this new technology, and (3) there are differences in organizational resources. Internet technology for retailers represents such a case. Internet technology has had a widespread impact on retailing, to the extent that some researchers even predicted that the Internet would lead to the demise of traditional retailing (e.g., Chen and Leteney 2000) . Strategic responses to the Internet vary significantly across retailers; for example, some retailers (e.g., Best Buy) formed alliances with IT firms, whereas others did not (e.g., Gottschalks); some adopted early (e.g., Wal-Mart), whereas others were slow (e.g., Jacobson Stores); and some had catalog operations (e.g., J.C. Penney), whereas others did not (e.g., May Department Stores). Finally, retailers differ significantly in the amount of resources they own, and some firms (e.g., Wal-Mart) have more than others (e.g., Good Guys).
Our research makes several important theoretical and managerial contributions. As we elaborate subsequently, it highlights the importance of strategic responses and organizational resources during the assimilation of new technology. We develop a typology of strategic responses to new technologies and demonstrate its efficacy. Furthermore, we provide secondary data-based measures to assess strategic responses and organizational resources, which then can be used to design longitudinal studies for various strategic marketing issues. With Tobin's q as the measure of firm performance, we also contribute to the understanding of the drivers that create shareholder wealth (e.g., Day and Fahey 1988; Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998) . For managers, this research helps uncover the impact of their responses to new technologies.
Conceptual Background
The three components of strategic responses-magnitude, domain, and speed-suggest that a response is likely to include one or more of the three components (thus, the overlapping circles in Figure 1 ). Response magnitude, or the intensity of a firm's response to new technology, can be assigned to a spectrum whose endpoints represent ignoring the new technology or assimilating it completely. Closer to 1 Some researchers have found that first-mover advantage does not always pay off and that motivated late movers become winners (e.g., Golder and Tellis 1993; Shankar, Carpenter, and Krishnamurthi 1998 ; for more details, see Tellis and Golder 2001) . Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) discuss first-mover disadvantage and suggest that late movers (1) can free ride on early movers, (2) can gain from the resolution of technological and market uncertainty, (3) can jump to reliable technologies, and (4) are less likely to succumb to incumbent inertia. Nonetheless, Lieberman and Montgomery's synthesis of literature on first-mover advantage shows more support for first movers than for late movers. Lieberman and Montgomery question Golder and Tellis's (1993) operationalization of first movers and recognize that innovative late movers can be more successful than first movers. the lower end of the spectrum, firms can adopt the technology on an experimental basis to "test the waters" and learn about the technology (Dickson 1992) . At relatively higher levels, firms may decide to adopt the technology as a backup, viable alternative, or complement to their existing technology. Response magnitude also might be measured according to money spent or number of employees involved with a task, after controlling for firm size and other confounding variables.
Response domain pertains to the business process, such as supply chain management, new product development, or CRM, that is affected by the new technology (e.g., Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1999) . Response domain can be conceptualized in terms of organizational routines, in the sense that routines represent "all regular and predictable behavioral patterns of firms" (Nelson and Winter 1982, p. 14) . For example, a loyalty management program (e.g., frequent shopper program), which is a component of a larger CRM process, can be viewed as a routine and thus as a possible domain of responses to new technologies.
Response speed represents the timeliness of the response, in that faster responses can preempt competitive actions and provide the firm with greater opportunities to learn the benefits of the new technology (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988, 1998) . First-mover advantage arises when learning curves generate barriers to the entry of other firms (Robinson 1988; Spence 1981) , and it enables the first mover to preempt scarce assets, such as physical resources (e.g., Robinson and Fornell 1985; Schmalensee 1978) , and shape consumer preferences, which lead to high switching costs (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989; Grewal, Cline, and Davies 2003) . Speed also has been shown to be vital for diverse strategic issues, including introducing new products, entering new markets, and responding to competitive threats (e.g., Bayus, Jain, and Rao 1997; Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson 1992) . Thus, we expect that firms that respond to a new technology more quickly than their rivals will be able to garner firstmover advantage. 1 Most responses to new technologies are likely to encompass two or more of the three response components. For example, although the prototype of an industrial robot was developed in the United States in the 1950s and its first commercial use was by a U.S. firm in 1961, it was Japanese automakers who adopted the technology en masse. Thus, the advantage went to the Japanese, whose slower speed
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Firm Performance was overcome by their higher magnitude and different domain application of the new technology (Tanzer and Simon 1990) . Similarly, firms that adopted electronic markets early and expended considerable efforts to learn about the new medium were able to use it successfully as an alternative sales channel (Grewal, Comer, and Mehta 2001) . Thus, according to existing research, various strategic options can be derived from any combination of response magnitude, domain, and speed.
Research Model
To test the conceptual framework (Figure 1 ), we apply it to the strategic responses of store-based retailers to the advent of the Internet. To be successful, store-based retailers must build knowledge and capabilities with regard to store and merchandise management, which are useful in designing store layouts, controlling traffic flow inside a store, and managing and maintaining the quality of in-store customer services, among other benefits. However, with the emergence of the Internet, store-based retailers needed to develop new capabilities to execute online retail operations (Amit and Zott 2001) . Specifically, online retailing requires IT capabilities to maintain a Web interface that is linked to back-end order-processing systems, logistics management systems, and strategic decision support systems. Online 2 The mismatch of capabilities between store-based and online retailing is amply illustrated by the case of Toys "R" Us. Somewhat surprised by the sudden emergence and gain in prominence of eToys.com, Toys "R" Us hurriedly launched its e-commerce operations. Poor navigability and technical glitches highlighted the company's dearth of IT capabilities, and its inability to physically deliver products on time (i.e., promised Christmas Day delivery) raised questions about its logistics capabilities (The Economist 2000) . In contrast, the success of some traditional retailers, such as J.C. Penney, in online ventures underscores the promise of this new medium for store-based retailers. retailers also must develop or acquire logistic management capabilities to complete an order by ensuring timely physical delivery to the homes of individual consumers, compared with traditional retailers, which need logistic capabilities to ensure in-store product availability. 2 This disparity in capabilities makes Internet adoption a consequential decision. Furthermore, as we reason subsequently, Internet adoption involves diversity in response magnitude, domain, and speed across firms. The diversity in the response components and the strategic importance of Internet adoption make the advent of the Internet for the retail industry an appropriate setting to study the relationships among strate- 
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3 We use Tobin's q, a forward-looking measure (e.g., Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl 2004) , to operationalize firm performance. Because the formula for Tobin's q contains share price, we refer to this measure as reflecting the market valuation of the firm. Thus, we use firm performance, market valuation of the firm, and Tobin's q interchangeably. 4 Another possible theoretical response is the integration of store-based and online operations. However, this response is empirically correlated with the speed of adoption of the Internet as a sales channel, and therefore we do not use it. gic responses, organizational resources, and firm performance (see Figure 2) . 3
Strategic Responses
A traditional retailer may adopt the Internet as a communications channel, whereas another may adopt it as a sales channel. As a communications channel, the Internet conveys information about products and store locations to consumers and information about finances to investors and shareholders. To use the Internet as a sales channel, retailers must develop online order-taking capabilities and build logistic capabilities to ensure the timely delivery of products. Thus, the adoption of the Internet as a sales channel represents a response of greater magnitude (i.e., it involves greater investments) than its adoption as a communications channel. Furthermore, communications and sales channels involve different business processes and therefore represent responses from different domains. In addition to communications and sales channel adoption, firms may respond to new technologies by forming e-alliances. E-alliances are strategic alliances that traditional retailers (e.g., Best Buy, Wal-Mart) form with IT firms (e.g., America Online [AOL], Microsoft) to acquire surrogate capabilities that facilitate information management, online transactions, and invoicing, among other things. To incorporate response speed, we theorize the responses as the speed of (1) communications channel adoption, (2) sales channel adoption, and (3) ealliance formation. 4 Communications/sales channel. Retailers that adopt the Internet as a communications channel can use it to convey company information, which represents an initial step in which a retailer learns about the new technology before adopting it as a sales channel. Sales channel adoption enables the retailer to provide its customers with an alternative to physical stores and thereby goes beyond communications channel adoption with its emphasis on generating sales (Burn, Marshall, and Wild 1999) .
Although adoption of the Internet seems important, we believe that it is critical to adopt the new technology in a timely manner. Consistent with extant literature that documents the importance of speed in strategic responses (Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson 1992; Lieberman and Montgomery 1988) , we expect that the speed with which retailers adopt the Internet as a communications and/or sales channel will have a positive effect on their performance.
E-alliances. By forming alliances with IT-capable firms, retailers can draw on the IT expertise of their partners. For example, Barnes & Noble partnered with AOL to market its Web site and to keep abreast of changes in the virtual world, and Best Buy allied with Microsoft for similar purposes.
Diverse theoretical perspectives imply the advantages of such alliances. Transaction cost economics suggests that the alliances should help retailers reduce transaction costs (Gulati 1995) , and organizational learning theory suggests that the alliances provide retailers with knowledge bases that they may lack (Parkhe 1993) . Alliances should enable retailers to expand their resource bases and to help build competitive advantage by reducing risks, generating scale economies, and facilitating cooperation in the development of production and technological know-how (e.g., Sivadas and Dwyer 2000; Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995) .
In contrast, resource dependence theorists argue that alliances may create asymmetrical resource situations between partners, which can lead to adverse performance outcomes (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . For example, Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998) find that firms receive a smaller share of an alliance "pie" when they rely on their partners for technological know-how. The literature on strategic alliances also cautions about the significance of bandwagon effects, which occur when firms form alliances simply because other firms are doing so. Such motivation for forming alliances usually affects firm performance negatively, because the alliances are formed primarily to meet legitimacy needs, not to achieve efficiency. Thus, whether ealliances benefit retailers remains an open empirical question.
Organizational Resources
Consistent with extant literature (Bourgeois 1981; Gatignon, Weitz, and Bansal 1990) , we use the amount of slack resources that a firm possesses to assess organizational resources. Slack resources are the buffer of idle resources that enables firms to be flexible and improvise (Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001; Moorman and Miner 1998) . We suggest that these idle bundles of resources enhance a firm's ability to assess, adopt, and assimilate new technologies.
Nevertheless, slack resources have opportunity costs associated with them, in that ex post unused resources would have been productively used (Nohria and Gulati 1996) . Thus, if slack resources are unused, they could have negative impacts on the firm. As opportunity cost reasoning suggests, as the level of resource slack increases, its marginal utility decreases. Thus, we include both linear and squared resource slack terms in our model to capture the diminishing marginal returns.
Strategic Response and Organizational Resources
Slack resources instill flexibility in firms, which enables them to respond to environmental opportunities and threats (Bourgeois 1981; Nohria and Gulati 1996) . The adoption of the Internet as a communications channel is such a situation, in which firms use the Internet to supplement and/or substitute for the communication they previously carried out through traditional channels. Given that the economic benefits of Internet communications are well documented (e.g., Rayport and Jaworski 2001) , the deployment of slack resources for adopting the Internet as a communications channel should prove beneficial for retailers.
The adoption of the Internet as a sales channel requires retailers to develop knowledge in previously unexplored domains. Slack resources thus offer store-based retailers the ability to study the new capabilities needed and to expend efforts to acquire or develop the capabilities (e.g., on-time delivery, effectively linked Web interface). Because online trade is fairly recent, it is difficult for many firms to understand its underlying cause-and-effect relationships. Firms with slack resources may display greater abilities to absorb and use new information, which thereby makes it easier for them to assimilate new technologies (Zahra and George 2002) and to uncover causal ambiguities (Reed and DeFillippi 1990) .
Control Variables
It is important to account for firm-, industry-, and economyspecific variables, because the market valuation of a firm (Tobin's q) can depend on these factors. We use catalog operations, cost of capital, and return on assets (ROA) to control for firm-specific effects; the Herfindahl index to control for industry-specific (competitive) effects; and changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) to control for the volatility of the economy. Firms with catalog operations, such as J.C. Penney, already had logistic systems in place to deliver products to the homes of individual consumers. Because developing such a logistic management capability is necessary for successful online sales, it becomes important to account for catalog operations. The cost of capital indicates the average interest rate that a firm pays for its long-term liabilities (Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999) . Capital usually comes from two sources: equity and debt. The nature of these two sources of equity is quite distinct, and their effects need to be considered. Regardless of profits or losses, firms must pay interest on liabilities. However, when losses are reported, the firms need not pay dividends on equity. We also account for ROA, which indicates the profitability of a business. Because a firm's current profitability is likely to affect its market valuation positively, it is important to account for this link. Profitability also depends on competitive intensity. Thus, we include the Herfindahl index as a control variable that accounts for industry-specific competitive effects. Finally, because we are conducting a longitudinal study, we must control for changes in the economy. We use the change in the GDP to achieve this control.
Thus, we present our research model in Figure 2 and Equations 1 and 2:
(1) Q = β 0 + β 1 × SCC + β 2 × SSC + β 3 × SECA + β 4i × RS + β 5 × CAT + β 6 × CC + β 7 × ROA + β 8 × GDP + β 9 × HERF + ε it , and (2)
where β and γ represent the effects of hypothesized and control variables; Q stands for Tobin's q; and SCC, SSC, SECA, RS, CAT, CC, ROA, GDP, and HERF stand for speed of communications channel adoption, speed of sales channel adoption, speed of e-alliance formation, resource slack, catalog operations, cost of capital, return on assets, changes in gross domestic product, and the Herfindahl index, respectively. We expect β 1 , β 2 , γ 0 , γ 2 , and γ 3 to be positive and γ 1 to be negative. We are unsure of the direction of β 3 .
Research Method
Data Sources
Because commercial use of the Internet began in 1994, we decided to study the nine-year period from 1992 to 2000 to capture the evolutionary effects of resource slack and strategic responses before and after the advent of the new technology. We drew the sample of traditional retailers for this study primarily from the COMPUSTAT database and supplemented it with other sources. The COMPUSTAT database for Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 53 (general merchandise), 54 (food stores), 56 (apparel and accessories), 57 (home furniture and furnishings), and 59 (miscellaneous) consists of 259 retailers. However, the database does not provide complete data for each of the retailers because (1) some retailers went out of business during that period (e.g., County Seat Stores), (2) a few retailers were acquired by other organizations (e.g., in 1998, Fred Meyer Inc. acquired Food 4 Less Holdings), and (3) new retail organizations were formed during the period (e.g., Amazon.com). For other missing data, we searched sources such as Compact Disclosure, EDGAR, Standard and Poor's industry reports, and company annual reports. We made every possible effort to obtain complete data for the nineyear period on all retailers. Furthermore, to derive Tobin's q (our measure of firm performance), we needed to know the closing share prices and preferred share values, which we obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. Inadequacies in the CRSP database, similar to those of the COM-PUSTAT database, further reduced the sample size. Because our research questions center on the efficacy of traditional retailers' strategic responses, we omitted retailers that employed only online operations (e.g., Amazon.com). Ultimately, we obtained complete data on 83 retailers that adopted the Internet between 1994 and 2000. We also obtained complete data on an additional 23 retailers that had not adopted the Internet during the period of our study. Thus, the sample consists of nine years of data for 106 retailers, for a total of 954 data points (Table 1) .
To record the strategic responses of the 83 retailers, we searched their Web sites and annual reports, as well as articles in business publications such as BusinessWeek, Forbes, Fortune, The Economist, and The Wall Street Journal. The sample constitutes approximately 41% of public retail firms. To determine whether there was bias in sample selection, we compared the sample with the population (all public retail firms) in terms of number of employees, sales, and retained earnings for the nine-year period. None of the tstatistics were statistically significant (p > .10). We therefore concluded that the sample was representative of the population.
Measures
Performance. We use Tobin's q as a measure of retailer performance. In marketing literature, Tobin's q has been used in studies related to brand equity (Simon and Sullivan 1993) and customer satisfaction (Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl 2004) . As a performance metric, Tobin's q has several advantages. First, it is derived from stock market price, which reflects future performance and therefore is a forward-looking measure. Second, Tobin's q reflects a firm's long-term profitability because it captures the relationship between the replacement cost of a firm's tangible assets and the market value of the firm (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and Konsynski 1999) . Third, Tobin's q can be used to compare across industries because it is not affected by accounting conventions (Chakravarthy 1986 ).
Specifically, we use Chung and Pruitt's (1994) method to calculate Tobin's q as follows:
where Q = Tobin's q, MVE = (closing price of shares at the end of the financial year) × (number of common shares outstanding), PS = liquidation value of the firm's outstanding preferred stock, DEBT = (current liabilities -current assets) + (book value of inventories) + (long-term debt), and TA = book value of total assets.
The year-end stock price is an important component of the Tobin's q formula. Therefore, the results and findings depend on a single measure of stock price, which can be volatile. To overcome this volatility problem, we took the average stock price at the end of the four quarters (i.e., March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31) to calculate Tobin's q. (We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.) The number of common shares outstanding also was taken as the average at the end of each of the four quarters. (The correlation between the quarterly and the year-end measures of Tobin's q is .89.)
Speed. We code speed as an ordinal variable that increases by an increment of one with every year that passes after a retailer makes a strategic response (i.e., adopts the Internet as a communications/sales channel or forms ealliances). For example, if a retailer adopted the Internet as a communications channel in 1996, we code the speed of communications channel adoption in years 1992 through 1995 as 0, 1996 as 1, 1997 as 2, and so on. With this measure of speed, retailers that adopted earlier score higher, and 
COMPUSTAT the annual incremental increases capture experiential gains (learning).
Resource slack. We use factor scores calculated from two financial ratios to assess resource slack: (1) retained earnings to total assets and (2) working capital to total assets. Retained earnings capture the resources that a firm decides to maintain as strategic options for unforeseen eventualities and implementation strategies (Bourgeois 1981) . The ratio of retained earnings to total assets accounts for firm size (total assets) and suggests that larger firms should have higher retained earnings. Thus, similar to other proxies for resource slack (e.g., earnings before interest and tax; Gatignon, Weitz, and Bansal 1990) , the retained ratio of earnings to total assets suggests that firms with higher performance usually have greater amounts of slack resources (Nohria and Gulati 1996; Singh 1986 ). The working capital measure is the firm's current assets less its current liabilities, which normally include inventory, account receivables, and cash. Unlike fixed assets, they are not subject to depreciation, though the devaluation of inventory may be a concern. However, different accounting practices-such as cost methods; first in, first out; and last in, first out-adopted by retailers should address the issue of inventory devaluation. In addition, the ratio of working capital to sales has been used in extant research (e.g., Chakravarthy 1986) to represent how effectively a firm uses its liquid assets to generate sales. The ratio of working capital to total assets controls for the effects of firm size (as reflected in total assets) and indicates that larger firms need greater amounts of working capital.
Control variables.
We control for catalog retailers by coding a dummy variable as 1 if the retailer had catalog operations and as 0 otherwise. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999), we use the interest rate for long-term liabilities to account for the effect of cost of capital. We measure ROA according to reports in the COMPUSTAT database and the change in GDP, as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. For the Herfindahl index, we square the market share of the top four firms classified in the same SIC code as the firm of interest. In Table 2 , we provide the bivariate correlations among the measures.
Identification of Strategic Responses
We use a historical approach to data collection (Golder 2000; Savitt 1980; Smith and Lux 1993 ) that involves careful examination of relevant published records. We follow Golder (2000) and evaluate the criticality of archival data obtained from at least two different sources to ensure that at least one data source is neutral, that all data sources are reliable, and that the data sources are independent. We carry out a structured content analysis of company annual reports, •We have e-alliances with Micron Electronics, Redline Entertainment, Simplexity.com, and etown.com.
•Our strategic partners include AOL and Sony Electronics.
•We develop alliances with other leading retailers to strengthen our ecommerce strategy.
•We partner with AOL and became an exclusive bookseller on AOL.
•We partner with major Web portals and content sites such as AOL, Lycos, and MSN.
•Our Web site provides product information, company background, and current news.
•Our home page provides news and other financial information to shareholders.
•Our Web site provides information such as 10-K reports, press releases, and other stockholder information.
•Our Web site does not focus on Internet selling yet, but investors can visit our Web site for financial information and other company news.
•In 1995, we first entered the ecommerce space with the launch of xxx.com.
•We began to develop sales on the Internet.
•In 1997, we launched our public Internet site, which enables customers to shop online.
•During the second quarter of this year, we began selling about 1500 items from our Web site.
press releases, and articles available on LexisNexis, BusinessWeek, The Economist, Fortune, Forbes, and The Wall Street Journal, as well as respective company Web sites, to identify when a retailer adopted the Internet as a communications and sales channel and when a retailer formed an ealliance. For each retailer, we searched for the following key words: "online," "e-commerce," "Internet," and "Web." For example, we searched for information on Walgreen's using the specified key words. In its 1995-1998 annual reports, Walgreen's stated that shareholders could access company information, such as press releases and financial data, on its Web site. Walgreen's announced in its 1999 annual report that the company became an Internet player in January 1998. Following contemporary historical research (e.g., Golder 2000), we reviewed all available information with respect to Walgreen's adoption of the Internet. After critically analyzing the available information, we coded 1995 as the year Walgreen's adopted the Internet as a communications channel and 1998 as the year it adopted the Internet as a sales channel. In Table 3 , we provide a sample of qualitative information we found and the way we coded the information.
Measure Validation
To assess the validity of the nominal data, which are based on qualitative judgments, two judges (one not involved with the research) independently analyzed the content of annual reports and other sources of information (e.g., Frankwick et al. 1994; Houston et al. 2001) . The judges first reviewed all company annual reports available on LexisNexis. Missing information was collected from alternative sources such as business journals. For 10 of the 83 retailers in the sample (randomly drawn), the judges worked together to develop a protocol and common understanding of the coding procedure. For the remaining 73 retailers, the judges completed the tasks independently.
We then assessed the Pearson product correlations between the judges' coding and the classifications of the 73 retailers. We found a high level of correlations for the three major constructs: for e-alliances, r = .91 (p < .01); for adoption of the Internet as a communications channel, r = .93 (p < .01); and for adoption of the Internet as a sales channel, r = .93 (p < .01). Any disagreements were resolved by discussion and revisiting the information sources. Finally, factor analysis showed that the two items for resource slack loaded on the latent construct with factor loadings equal to .85.
Empirical Analysis and Results
Estimation Procedure and Model Selection
The estimation procedure was driven by the need to control for unmeasured and unobservable variables (Jacobson 1990 ). Because there is no single model recommended for controlling for unobserved effects (Boulding 1990 ), we estimated two models (1) a two-factor fixed-and randomeffects linear panel model (TPM) and (2) a single-factor fixed-and random-effects autoregressive panel model (ARPM). Specifically, the fixed-effects TPM model can be represented as follows: (4) y it = µ + α i + γ t + β′X it + ε it , where µ = the overall constant; α i = firm-specific constants; γ t = time-specific constants; X = the explanatory variables; β = a vector of the influence of the explanatory variables; and ε it = the error term, such that E(ε it ) = 0, and E(ε 2 it ) = σ ε . A parallel representation of the random-effects model is given as follows: (5) y it = µ + β′X it + ε it + ν i + λ t , where ν i = the random disturbance characterizing the ith firm that is constant through time, and the assumptions are E(ν i ) = 0, and E(ν 2 it ) = σ ν ; and λ t = the random disturbance characterizing the tth year that is constant across firms, and the assumptions are E(λ t ) = 0, and E(λ 2 it ) = σ λ . The following assumptions apply: E(ε it, , ν j ) = 0, E(ε it, , λ s ) = 0, and E(ν i , λ t ) = 0 ∀ i, t, j, and s. Furthermore, E(ε it, , ε js ) = 0, E(ν i , ν j ) = 0, and E(λ t , λ s ) = 0 if i ≠ j and t ≠ s, ∀ i, t, j, and s.
The fixed-effects ARPM model is given as follows:
where ρ represents the autocorrelation coefficient, and η it is the error term, such that E(η it ) = 0 and E(η 2 it ) = σ η . A parallel representation of the random-effects model is given as follows: (7) y it = µ + β′X it + ε it + ν i , and
For both the TPM and the ARPM models, we use the Hausman (1978) test to compare the fit of the fixed-effects model with that of the random-effects model. This statistic is distributed χ 2 , and a statistically significant value favors the fixed-effects model. We estimated the following six models: We calculate the AIC as AIC = -2 × LL + 2 × NP, where LL and NP stand for the log-likelihood value and the number of parameters, respectively. We calculate the BIC and the CAIC as BIC = -2 × LL + ln(SS) × NP, and CAIC = -2 × LL + [1 + ln(SS)] × NP, respectively, where SS stands for the sample size and ln is the natural logarithm transformation.
M3: X variables only; M4: X and firm effects; M5: X, firm, and time effects (this configuration does not apply for the ARPM); and M6: a random-effects version of M5 for TPM and of M4 for ARPM.
Note that for ARPM, M1-M4 are autoregressive models. We use ordinary least squares to estimate models M1-M5, with dummy variables for firm and time effects when appropriate, and we use generalized least squares for M6 (for details, see Baltagi 1995) . Finally, to compare TPM with ARPM, we used the Akaike, Bayesian, and consistent Akaike information criteria (AIC, BIC, and CAIC, respectively). 5
Model Selection Results
We used a series of likelihood ratio tests to compare the first five models, whereas we compared M6 with M5 for TPM and with M4 for ARPM using the Hausman (1978) test. We report the results of these tests in Table 4 . The tests show that the two-way fixed-effects model (M5) outperforms the other submodels for TPM and that the one-way fixedeffects autoregressive model outperforms its submodels for ARPM. The Hausman test shows that the fixed-effects 6 Multicollinearity did not seem to be a concern; the highest variance inflation factor was 2.4, and the highest condition index was 3.9.
7 Descriptive statistics for the 83 firms that adopted the Internet are as follows: for communications channel adoption (83 firms), there were 3 in 1995, 17 in 1996, 12 in 1997, 14 in 1998, 25 in 1999, and 12 in 2000; for sales channel adoption (50 firms), there was 1 in 1995, 3 in 1996, 3 in 1997, 9 in 1998, 23 in 1999, and 11 in 2000; and for e-alliances (34 alliances), there was 1 in 1996, 1 model outperforms the random-effects model for TPM (χ 2 = 60.24, degrees of freedom [d.f.] = 12, p < .01). Similarly, the Hausman test shows that for ARPM, the fixedeffects model outperforms the random-effects model (χ 2 = 66.06, d.f. = 12, p < .01). The autocorrelation coefficient for ARPM is positive and statistically significant (ρ = .32, p < .01). Finally, the information criteria show that the ARPM (R 2 = .77) outperforms the TPM (R 2 = .72). 6
Research Model Results
The results provide some support for the main effects of strategic responses (see Table 5 ). 7 The speed of communi- in 1997, 5 in 1998, 11 in 1999, and 16 in 2000 . The mean year-end Tobin's q is 1.92 with a standard deviation of 1.61; the quarterly Tobin's q is 1.38 with a standard deviation of 1.54. The Tobin's q ranges from -.80 to 26.58.
cations channel adoption appears to enhance firm performance (TPM: b = .085, p < .05; ARPM: b = .076, p < .05), and slack resources strengthen this positive effect (TPM: b = .055, p < .05; ARPM: b = .060, p < .05). The results show that the speed of e-alliance formation also enhances firm performance (TPM: b = .227, p < .10; ARPM: b = .263, p < .05). However, we do not find support for the main and interaction effect of sales channel adoption. This unexpected finding may be due to the empirical correlation between communications channel adoption and sales channel adoption (ρ = .687, p < .01; see Table 2 ) or the cannibalization potential of the Internet channel. Alternatively, because we study market-based performance, the finding may reflect that the value of a firm increases when it adopts the Internet as a communications channel. Furthermore, it is possible that investor attention focused on the presence of nonincumbent (new entrant) firms, the so-called dot-coms, and as a result, the market valuation of incumbents was not influenced.
To explore these conjectures further, we estimate two models. In the model without communications channel adoption variables, the statistical results for sales channel adoption remain the same. When we combine the speed of sales channel adoption with a dummy variable for catalog operations, the interaction effect is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the value of retailers with catalog operations increases with the adoption of the Internet as a sales channel (TPM: b = .199, p < .05; ARPM: b = .197, p < .05) . Finally, we find that slack resources tend to decrease Tobin's q (TPM: b = -.279, p < .01; ARPM: b = -.278, p < .01). The firms in our sample may have excess slack resources, and the opportunity costs associated with these resources may outweigh the gains that can be obtained from them. Managers often accumulate slack resources to pursue their own interests, which can be at odds with the organizational needs to create the strategic options that slack resources provide (Child 1972; Cyert and March 1963) .
Model Robustness Results
We took three steps to ensure that the results were robust. First, we estimated the research model (Equations 1 and 2) with data until 1999 as opposed to 2000. Because the Internet "bubble" burst in 2000 (i.e., the NASDAQ market value dropped from $5.2 trillion in 1999 to $3.6 trillion in 2000), we thought it would be interesting to study how the results might change. As is shown in the two right-hand columns of Table 5 , the results are substantively the same. Second, we estimated three submodels nested in the research model (Equations 1 and 2). Submodel 1 included the control variables, Submodel 2 included the control and resource variables, and Submodel 3 added the main effects of the strategic response to the control and resource variables. The signs and statistical significance of the parameter estimates did not change across the models. Third, we estimated two models nested in the research model (Equations 1 and 2). Model 1 included the interactions between the speed of ealliance formation and the speed of communications channel adoption and sales channel adoption. Model 2 included the square terms of speed of communications and sales channel adoption. None of the effects across the two models were statistically significant. Thus, we have a fair degree of confidence that the results are robust.
Discussion
As new technologies continue to proliferate, firms in diverse industries increasingly must respond. Future economic rents and competitive advantage rests on the organizational ability to assimilate new technologies in a timely manner. To address this important research issue, we develop a general framework that describes the influence of organizational strategic responses on firm performance (Figure 1 ). We theorize strategic responses according to the three dimensions of magnitude, domain, and speed, and we suggest that a response can encompass one or more of these dimensions. In this framework, we rely on the resourcebased view of the firm (Hunt and Morgan 1995) and the organizational learning literature (Sinkula 1994) to suggest that organizational resources determine the efficacy of the strategic response. We also operationalize the framework for retailers' response to the advent of the Internet. The results highlight the importance of organizational strategic responses and resources and demonstrate the potency of our framework.
Speedier communications channel adoption, useful in preempting competition for scarce resources (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988) and learning from experience (e.g., Sinkula 1994), seems to yield significant returns. Furthermore, firms with slack resources seem to garner greater returns from communications channel adoption. For example, the comparison of Staples and Office Depot illustrates this advantage. Staples adopted the Internet as a communications channel in 1995 and as a sales channel in 1998, whereas Office Depot, its major competitor, did not adopt it until 1998. The difference in the year 2000 Tobin's q for Office Depot (.97) and Staples (2.08) can be attributed in part to their responses to the advent of the Internet. Similarly, The Gap adopted the Internet as a communications and sales channel in 1996, whereas Urban Outfitters did not adopt it until 2000. The year 2000 Tobin's q for The Gap was 4.81, compared with 1.11 for Urban Outfitters. In Table  6 , we present details about the strategic response variables and firm performance at various points in time for 40 retailers. Careful scrutiny of Table 6 provides more examples of the benefits of appropriate strategic responses.
However, sales channel adoption does not seem to influence firm performance (Christensen 1997) . Perhaps the market does not reward firms for adopting the Internet as a sales channel because the adoption may cannibalize existing store operations. Alternatively, the market may reward firms for their initial communications channel adoption, and then the effect of the sales channel adoption filters in through enhanced sales and profitability. Furthermore, as a result of the attention focused on dot-com new entrants, investors may have overlooked and undervalued the online sales of incumbents. Thus, the only thing that mattered for incumbents was whether they had a Web presence. The data lean in favor of this conjecture; communications and sales channel adoptions are correlated (ρ = .687, p < .01; see Table 2 ), and profitability (ROA) positively influences Tobin's q. Furthermore, the interaction between slack resources and sales channel adoption is not statistically significant. Thus, it seems that slack resources do not enable firms to develop the new capabilities needed for sales channel adoption. Nonetheless, our post hoc analysis reveals a positive interaction between speed of sales channel adoption and the dummy variable for catalog operations (p < .05). This result suggests that firms with catalog operations that adopted more quickly tended to have higher performance.
The literature is unclear about whether e-alliances yield positive or negative consequences for retailers. On the one hand, e-alliances yield the benefits of lower transaction costs (Gulati 1998 ) and surrogate knowledge bases (Parkhe 1991 It is important to recognize that because of the way we operationalize e-alliances, we will find positive, negative, or statistically nonsignificant parameter estimates. Thus, we will find support for at most one of the two perspectives. It would be valuable to come up with other operationalizations of e-alliances (e.g., that use two operationalizations) to find support for both positive and negative effects. (We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.) for the nontechnical, or store-based, partner (Das, Sen, and Sengupta 1998) . In addition, if e-alliances are formed because others are doing so (i.e., the bandwagon effect), the consequences of the alliances can be negative (e.g., Pangarkar and Klein 1998). Our results show that the gains of lower transaction costs and surrogate knowledge bases seem to overshadow any losses due to asymmetrical resource dependence. 8
Limitations and Future Research Implications
We rely on secondary data to test the model, and thus our investigation is limited to the variables for which we could obtain data. For example, a measure such as dollar spending on online operations would be appropriate to capture response magnitude. Furthermore, our sample is limited to public firms, which means that many private retailers are not captured in this research. Although we use the Herfindahl index to control for competitive effects, we do not include nonincumbent retailers that used Internet-based business models. It would be interesting to study the competition between incumbents that adopt a new technology to supplement existing operations and nonincumbents that rely primarily on the new technology. In addition, we suggest that strategic variables determine the market valuation of the firm. However, it is possible that market valuation drives some strategic response variables, specifically e-alliance formation. In other words, firms that are highly valued may seem to be attractive alliance partners. Further research is needed to rule out such endogeneity. Finally, as in most secondary data research, we do not account for measurement error, which can lead to biased estimates. Such measurement error manifests itself in measures obtained from COMPUSTAT, such as resource slack and Tobin's q, and from strategic response measures we coded using other secondary data sources, such as searches on LexisNexis. These limitations provide potentially fruitful avenues for further research.
Theoretical Implications
The two primary theoretical contributions of this research are the development of a conceptual framework for strategic responses to new technologies and the linking of marketing actions to market valuation of the firm. First, we suggest that strategic response and organizational resources together affect firm performance. Our conceptualization of organizational strategic responses is a potent tool that researchers can use to study the adoption and assimilation of new technologies. The illustration of the adoption of the Internet demonstrates the potency of the proposed framework and exemplifies how the framework can be operationalized.
Second, when the value of marketing as a discipline is questioned, the linking of marketing actions to shareholder wealth is likely to go a long way toward further establishing the worth of the discipline (Day and Fahey 1988) . We theoretically link marketing actions in response to new technologies with the market valuation of the firm and empirically establish this link. For example, the results show that shareholders value the improvements in marketing communications that can be attributed to the adoption of the Internet. In other words, shareholders value marketing decisions related to new technology and foresee future economic gains in the organizational adoption and assimilation of new technologies.
From a methodological standpoint, we use secondary data from multiple sources to study a strategic marketing research issue. Whereas most research on marketing strategies relies on survey data and suffers from common methods bias, we show that the relationship between strategic marketing actions and firm performance is not an artifact of common methods. The longitudinal nature of the study also illustrates the dynamic nature of the effects of strategic marketing actions.
Finally, we contribute to the growing literature that attempts to make sense of the implications of the emergence of the Internet. Although the advent of the Internet is considered critical for the business arena, to date we are unaware of any attempt to link strategic responses to its advent with the market valuation of the firm (cf. Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002) . The model sheds some light on this important question and emphasizes the importance of modeling the interactions between organizational strategic responses and resources (Figure 2 ).
Managerial Implications
This research also sheds light on two important strategic issues for managers: the value of strategic responses to new technologies and the market valuation of the firm. The results suggest that an appropriate response-as defined by response magnitude, domain, and speed-is needed to assimilate new technologies successfully. In our results, retailers that speedily adopted the Internet as a communications channel were more valued by their shareholders. For example, our model predicts a Tobin's q of .907 for a retailer that adopted the Internet as communications channel in 1994, 2.4 times greater than the Tobin's q of .375 for a retailer that did not adopt the Internet until 2000 (if all other variables are fixed at their mean values) and almost twice that of a retailer that waited until 1999 to adopt (.527). The results also suggest that firms not oriented toward technology can benefit from partnering with technology firms because such alliances lower transaction costs and provide surrogate knowledge bases. For example, a firm that adopted the Internet as a communications channel in 1994 and engaged in an e-alliance would have a Tobin's q of approximately 2.729, more than three times greater than that of a firm that adopted in 1994 but did not form any e-alliances. Our results also highlight the importance of using slack resources to adopt the Internet as a communications channel. However, although slack resources may be useful in ventures that do not require the development of new capabilities, they are not effective for reengineering business processes when new capabilities must be developed (e.g., sales channel adoption).
